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For quantum key distribution (QKD) using spontaneous parametric-down-conversion sources
(SPDCSs), the passive decoy-state protocol has been proved to be efficiently close to the theo-
retical limit of an infinite decoy-state protocol. In this paper, we apply a tight finite-key analysis
for the passive decoy-state QKD using SPDCSs. Combining the security bound based on the uncer-
tainty principle with the passive decoy-state protocol, a concise and stringent formula for calculating
the key generation rate for QKD using SPDCSs is presented. The simulation shows that the secure
distance under our formula can reach up to 182 km when the number of sifted data is 1010. Our
results also indicate that, under the same deviation of statistical fluctuation due to finite-size effects,
the passive decoy-state QKD with SPDCSs can perform as well as the active decoy-state QKD with
a weak coherent source.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two legal
communication parties to acquire the identical key based
on quantum mechanics. Since the invention of the first
pioneer QKD protocol, BB84 protocol [1], people have
achieved great progress both in QKD’s theory and ex-
periment [2–9]. On the way toward the industrializa-
tion of QKD, people have faced sorts of obstacles, one
of which comes from the fact that the necessary assump-
tions required for QKD’s unconditional security are not
easy to satisfy in a real situation [10]. Practical fac-
tors, i.e., inefficient authentication of classical communi-
cation, imperfections of setups and finite-size data, will
undoubtedly threaten the security of a real QKD system
and quantum hacking strategies can be successfully de-
rived to attack the practical QKD system [11–13]. How-
ever, corresponding countermeasures can be applied to
combat these attacks. One approach is to employ the
notion of device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) [14–21].
The other, although difficult to implement, is to math-
ematically characterize the impact of imperfect factors
on QKD’s security as comprehensively as possible by a
security proof[10].
The notion of finite-length keys is one of practical im-
perfections need to be solved in the practical security
of QKD. In the case of finite-length keys, the security
bound in the asymptotic regime should be reconsidered,
and several attempts have been made to tackle this prob-
lem [22–26]. In recent years, based on the composable se-
curity definition derived from trace distance [27], several
∗Electronic address: 2010thzz@sina.com
significant advances have been achieved [28–34], with the
most pioneering one being the bound from the smooth
min-entropy by Scarani and Renner [29]. By noting that
the uncertainty relation can be generalized to one formu-
lated in terms of smooth entropies and that this directly
implies the security of QKD protocols [4], Tomamichel
et al. [35] creatively introduced the entropic formula-
tion of the uncertainty relation into the security anal-
ysis of finite-length keys. Since then, many attempts
were made to improve the security bound of finite re-
sources, such as the situations for permutation-invariant
protocols under coherent attacks [36], active decoy-state
QKD [37], measurement-device-independent QKD [38],
one-sided device-independent QKD [39], and the B92
protocol [40]. It should be noted that, by applying gener-
alized chain rules for smooth min-entropies [41], informa-
tion leakage from multiphoton pulses and vacuum pulses
that the eavesdropper may exploit can be well bounded
[37]. Thus, the result of Ref. [35] can be applied to most
real situations when practical photon sources are used,
e.g., weak coherent sources (WCSs) and spontaneous-
parametric-down-conversion sources (SPDCSs).
SPDCS, like the commonly used WCSs, is also within
reach of current technology and can be considered as an-
other candidate of the perfect single photon source. How-
ever, due to the multiphoton fraction, QKD using SPD-
CSs is also vulnerable to the photon-number-splitting at-
tack [42]. The active decoy-state method [43–45], i.e.,
actively and randomly varying the intensity of each sig-
nal state by a variable optical attenuator (VOA), can
be conducted to combat this attack. But in some cases
the imperfections of VOA might cause some physical pa-
rameters to rely on the particular setting selected and
then threaten QKD’s security [46]. Thus, passive prepa-
ration of intensity might be desirable in practice, and the
2first passive decoy-state protocol was presented by intro-
ducing a photon number resolving detector [47]. Then,
Adachi et al. [48] presented an efficient passive decoy-
state proposal (AYKI protocol) which can be easily re-
alized with a practical threshold detector. More impor-
tantly, it is proved to be efficient enough for estimating
the contribution of the single-photon pulse. Later, Ma
and Lo [49] generalized the results of Refs. [48] and [47]
to the most common case and Curty et al. [50] proposed
a new passive decoy-state scheme for QKD using WCSs
by subtly fitting a beam splitter with a threshold detector
for triggering. However, all of the above results regard-
ing the passive decoy-state scheme are obtained in the
condition of asymptotic infinite-length keys. An effort
to derive the security bound for the passive decoy-state
method under finite resources has been made by Tan and
Cai [51]. Their work is based on an indirect approach of
tracing coherent attacks to collective attacks by the de
Finetti theorem [52]. And for the direct approach based
on the uncertainty principle [35], how the finite-size ef-
fect influences the performance of a passive decoy-state
protocol needs further studying. This is just what we
intend to clarify here.
In this paper, we directly introduce the formula of key
generation rate obtained from Ref. [37] into the cases
for passive decoy-state protocol. The difference is in the
parameter estimation step, i.e., the way to estimate the
single-photon yield and error rate in the scenario of finite-
length keys. The starting point of the passive decoy-state
protocol under asymptotic infinite-length keys is that the
yield and bit error rate of the n-photon states from the
triggered pulses are both equal to that from the nontrig-
gered pulses. But this condition is no longer true un-
der the condition of finite-length keys due to statistical
fluctuations. Hence, we shall reconsider the steps of a
passive decoy-state protocol for estimating single-photon
yield and error rate. Luckily, it is found that the yield
and bit error rate of n-photon states can be considered
as random variables emanating from sampling without
replacement. Then, by applying the Serfling bound [53]
in sample theory, one can construct confidence regions
of the interval estimate for these variables, which was
first introduced into the parameter estimation of QKD
by Scarani et al. [29] and then improved by Tomamichel
et al. [35] and Mertz et al. [36]. Thus, in the confidence
regions, there certainly exist relationships for the param-
eters between triggered events and nontriggered events,
which can be directly applied to estimate the gain and bit
error rate of triggered and non-triggered single-photon
events, respectively. In particular, without relying on any
approximation, we introduce a rigorous method based on
a hypergeometric argument [33] to bound the quantity
of the maximal information of an eavesdropper on the
single-photon events. Note that our security analysis is
conducted based on the uncertainty principle and that
bound in [33] holds true under no approximation; thus
the formulas we obtain are valid for general coherent at-
tacks and our results guarantee unconditional security.
We compare our results with those derived from active
decoy protocol [37] and the simulations show the effi-
ciency of our protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we fix
the security preliminaries, clarify the formalism used to
calculate secret key rates under the assumption of general
attacks and introduce the bound for estimating the phase
error rate in our protocol. Section III recalls the AYKI
protocol for QKD with asymptotic infinite-length keys.
The main results of this paper, i.e., tight formulas for
estimating the yield and bit error rate for single-photon
events, are presented in Sec. IV. Section V numerically
simulates our results and Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. SECURITY CRITERIA AND SMOOTH
MIN-ENTROPY
In this paper we consider an asymmetric coding BB84
protocol, where the bases X and Z are chosen with prob-
abilities qX and qZ that are biased. The protocol consists
of these steps: state preparation, state measurement, sift-
ing, parameter estimation (PE), error correction (EC),
error verification, and privacy amplification (PA) (for a
detailed description, see Ref. [37]). The protocol out-
puts are SA and SB on Alice’s and Bob’s side respec-
tively. Only and only if successfully passing all of the
above steps can SA and SB be considered secure. Here,
the security criterion based on trace distance, seminally
proposed by Renner, is introduced in our analysis [27]:
Definition 1 (composable security definition). Assume
a QKD protocol outputs keys of SA and SB on Al-
ices and Bobs side respectively. It is considered to be
ε − secure if it satisfies both the correctness and the
secrecy. Correctness means that the protocol is εcor-
correct if P (SA 6= SB) ≤ εcor, namely the probability
of SA 6= SB will not exceed εcor. Secrecy means that the
protocol is εsec − secret if ppass2 ‖ρSE − US ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsec
where S represents either of the keys SA and SB, ρE is the
system that the eavesdropper owns, ρSE is the classical-
quantum state describing the joint state of S and E, US
is the uniform mixture of all possible values of S, and
ppass is the probability that all steps of the protocol are
successfully conducted.
Smooth min-entropy, relying on a generalization of the
von Neumann entropy, is an essential tool in the security
proof based on information theory [27]. Combined with
the uncertainty principle, it directly implies a security
proof without the assumption that the measurement de-
vices work according to the specifications of the protocol
[4]. In particular, it can provide us an efficient method
for the finite-key analysis [35]. If we denote H as a fi-
nite dimensional Hilbert space and let P(H) be the set
of positive semidefinite operators on H. Then, the set of
normalized quantum states and subnormalized ones can
be presented by S(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : trρ = 1} and
S6(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : trρ 6 1}, respectively. Given the-
ses, the definition of smooth min-entropy can be defined
3as the following[27]:
Definition 2 (smooth min-entropy). Let ε ≥ 0, σB ∈
S(HB) and ρAB ∈ S6(HAB). The smooth min-entropy
Hεmin(A|B), taken over a set of states Bε(ρ) that are ε-
close to ρAB, is defined as the quantity
max
ρ˜∈Bε(ρAB)
{− log2min{λ > 0 : ∃σB : ρ˜AB ≤ λidA ⊗ σB}},
(1)
where Bε(ρ) := {ρ˜AB ∈ S6(HAB) : C(ρAB , ρ˜AB) 6
ε}, idA is the identity operator on A, C(ρAB, ρ˜AB) :=
1− (tr|√ρ√ρ˜|)21/2 is a distance measure based on fi-
delity and ε is called the smoothing parameter.
There exists the following chain rule for the smooth
min-entropy[41, 54]:
Lemma 1 (Chain-rule inequality for the smooth min-
entropy). Let ε ≥ 0, ε′, ε′′ ≥ 0, and ρABC ∈ S6(HABC).
Then
Hε+ε
′+2ε′′
min (AB|C)ρ ≥ Hε
′′
min(A|BC)ρ +Hε
′
min(B|C)ρ
−f(ε),
(2)
where f(ε) = log2
1
1−√1−ε2 .
Let system E′ be the information that Eve obtains on
the raw key XA of Alice, prior to the error-verification
step. Then, after the privacy amplification step, the
length of the secure key SA can be expressed by the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 2 (Secret key based on smooth min-entropy)
[27, 37]: By applying privacy amplification with two-
universal hashing, a secret key extracted from XA is εsec-
secret if its length ℓ is chosen such that
⌊Hνmin(XA|E′)− 2 log2 12ν ⌋, (3)
where ν + ν ≤ εsec with ν and ν chosen to be propor-
tional to εsecppass , and H
ν
min(XA|E′) quantifies the amount
of uncertainty system E has on XA.
III. AYKI PROTOCOL WITH
INFINITE-LENGTH KEYS
In the AYKI protocol, two-mode states are prerequi-
site and we consider thoses emitted from the nondegen-
erate spontaneous-parametric-down-conversion (SPDC)
process. This type of SPDC processes creates the two-
mode state [55]
(coshχ)−1
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)neinθ |n, n〉. (4)
Set the intensity µ of the source to sinh2 χ, then the above
description simplifies to
∞∑
n=0
√
µn
(1+µ)n+1
einθ |n, n〉 (5)
When the sender (Alice) measures one mode of her
states from the above SPDCS with a practical threshold
detector described by detection efficiency ηA and dark-
count rate dA, the other mode can be divided into two
parts according to the response of the threshold detector,
i.e., the triggered events and nontriggered events. Both
of the them are sent to the lossy channel, detected by
the receiver’s (Bob’s) detector and devoted to the final
secret key. In particular, the nontriggered events, acting
as the role of decoy states, can be used to estimate the
single-photon contribution and single-photon error.
In this case, the signal n-photon events with proba-
bility pn are also divided into two parts, the triggered
n-photon events with probability of p
(t)
n and the nontrig-
gered n-photon events with probability of p
(nt)
n . Let γn be
the probability of detection (triggering) when n photons
are emitted from the SPDC process. Then, p
(t)
n = pnγn
and p
(nt)
n = pn(1− γn) with [48]
pn =
µn
(1+µ)n+1 , γn = 1− (1− dA)(1 − ηA)n. (6)
In this paper, we consider the measurement model
mentioned in Ref. [48]. It should be noted that, in
the case of asymptotic infinite-length keys, it is assumed
that the detection rate (yield) and quantum bit error rate
(QBER) of the triggered n-photon events are the same
as those of the nontriggered n-photon events, i.e.,
Y
(t)
n = Y
(nt)
n , e
(t)
n = e
(nt)
n . (7)
Under this condition, it is not easy to find that [48]
Q
(t)
n = δnQ
(nt)
n , (8)
where Q
(t)
n = Y
(t)
n pnγn, Q
(nt)
n = Y
(nt)
n pn(1 − γn) and
δn =
γn
1−γn . Noting that 0 ≤ δ0 < δ1 < δ2 < · · · and
considering the overall detection rate Q(t) =
∑∞
n=0Q
(t)
n
with triggering and Q(nt) =
∑∞
n=0Q
(nt)
n without trigger-
ing, one can obtain a lower bound for the single-photon
detection rate Q
(nt)
1 without triggering [48]:
Q
(nt)
1 ≥ (δ2−δ)Q
(nt)−(δ2−δ0)Q(nt)0
δ2−δ1 , ξ(Q
(nt)
0 ), (9)
where δ = Q
(t)
Q(nt)
. Then, taking the overall QBER
E(t) =
∑∞
n=0
Q(t)n e
(t)
n
Q(t)
with triggering and the one E(nt) =
∑∞
n=0
Q(nt)n e
(nt)
n
Q(nt)
without triggering into account, one can
derive a upper bound for the single-photon error rate [48]:
e1 ≤ min(2δE
(t)Q(nt)−δ0Q(nt)0
2δ1ξ(Q
(nt)
0 )
,
2E(nt)Q(nt)−Q(nt)0
2ξ(Q
(nt)
0 )
) , ǫ(Q
(nt)
0 ),
(10)
where 0 ≤ Q(nt)0 ≤ min(2E(t)Q(nt)(δ/δ0), 2E(nt)Q(nt)).
Takeing both of the keys derived from the triggered
events and nontriggered events into consideration, and
applying the GLLP formula [3], one can obtain the final
key rate which is shown by Eqs.(13) and (14) in Ref. [48].
4IV. PASSIVE DECOY-STATE PROTOCOL
WITH FINITE-LENGTH KEYS
Due to the effect of finite-size data sets in real-
life experiments, there exist various fluctuations in the
parameter-estimation step [56]. For a SPDCS, it is
proved that the AYKI protocol actually always holds
with whatever intensity fluctuation of pump light [57].
Hence, in this paper, we mainly consider the influence
of the finite-size effect on the estimation of single-photon
yield, single-photon error rate, and phase error rate.
A. Phase error rate
Here, the phase errors, an argument arising from the
Shor–Preskill formalism [2], means that the maximal vir-
tual errors come from the activity of smart eavesdrop-
pers. It can not be directly measured in experiment and,
in the case of a finite-size data set, has to be estimated via
a random-sampling theory according to the observed bit
errors. In this paper, we apply the interval estimation
based on the straightforward bounds [33] from an ap-
proaching technique for the hypergeometric distribution.
It should be noted that this estimation is in accordance
with the security criteria based on trace distance and,
most importantly, is proved to be tighter than the one in
Ref. [35] and more stringent than the one in Ref. [58].
Lemma 3 (straightforward bound). Let n, l and c be
the sifted bits, sample bits and observed error bits, re-
spectively. Suppose the final keys of the QKD protocol
are εsec-secret, then their phase error rate ep is given by
[33]
ep =
(n+l)eˆ(c+2)−leob(c+2)
n , g(eob(c)), (11)
with
eˆ(c) =
eob(c)+2τ+2
√
τ{eob(c)[1−eob(c)]+τ}
1+4τ ,
τ = ω
2n
4l(n+l−1) ,
eob(c) = c/l,
(12)
where ω is chosen satisfying
√
n+l
n
√
ω2+2π
2 e
νΦ(ω) 6 116εsec
2. (13)
Here, ν = 16n +
1
12 and Φ(ω) =
1√
2π
∫∞
ω
exp(−y
2
2 )dy.
B. single-photon yield
In the case of finite-length keys, the yield of the trig-
gered n-photon events are no longer equal to that of the
nontriggered ones, i.e.,
Y
(t)
n 6= Y (nt)n . (14)
However, by the theory of probability statistics, there
certainly exist relations between the two parts in con-
crete confidence regions. This means, that the yield of
the triggered n-photon events is ξ close to that of the
nontriggered ones, which corresponds to the two parts
being equal except with a probability of ǫn. Here, we
consider the bound widely used in finite-key QKD and
first introduce the following lemma into estimating the
relation between the yields [35, 36]:
Lemma 4. Let ǫn > 0 and n1, n2 > 0. Let ρ
n1
and ρn2 be the quantum state of the triggered and non-
triggered n-photon events, respectively. They are both
permutation-invariant quantum states, and let E be a
positive-operator-value measure (POVM) on HAB which
outputs the yield and quantum bit error rate, where
ρn1+n2 ∈ S(H⊗n1+n2AB ). Let Y(t)n and Y(nt)n be the fre-
quency distribution of the measurement events, e.g., the
yield, when applying the measurement En1 and En2 , re-
spectively. Then, for any element Y
(t)
n and Y
(nt)
n from
Y
(t)
n and Y
(nt)
n except with probability ǫn,
1
2 ‖ Y
(t)
n − Y (nt)n ‖6 ξ(ǫn, n1, n2), (15)
with ξ(ǫn, n1, n2) =
√
(n1+n2)(n1+1) ln(1/ǫn)
8n12n2
, where n1
and n2 are the number of n-photon triggered events and
n-photon nontriggered events, respectively, chosen for pa-
rameter estimation.
Note that the overall detection rate with triggering and
without triggering are expressed respectively by
Q(t) =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(t)
n =
∞∑
n=0
Y
(t)
n pnγn, (16)
Q(nt) =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(nt)
n =
∞∑
n=0
Y
(nt)
n pn(1− γn). (17)
Equation (17) is multiplied by δ2 and we obtain
δ2Q
(nt) = δ2Q
(nt)
0 + δ2Q
(nt)
1 + δ2
∞∑
k=2
Q
(nt)
k . (18)
From Eq.(15), we can find that Y
(nt)
n 6 Y
(t)
n +2ξn, where
ξn = ξ(ǫn, n1, n2). Then, the third term of the right-hand
side of the above equation satisfies
δ2
∞∑
k=2
Q
(nt)
k 6 δ2
∞∑
k=2
(Y
(t)
k + 2ξk)pk(1 − γk)
6
∞∑
k=2
(Y
(t)
k + 2ξk)pkγk
=
∞∑
k=2
Q
(t)
k + 2
∞∑
k=2
ξkpkγk,
(19)
where
∞∑
k=2
Q
(t)
k = Q
(t)−Q(t)0 −Q(t)1 . Hence, from Eq.(17),
5one can obtain
δ2(Q
(nt) −Q(nt)0 −Q(nt)1 )
6 Q(t) −Q(t)0 −Q(t)1 + 2
∞∑
k=2
ξkpkγk
6 Q(t) + (2ξ1 − Y (nt)1 )p1γ1 + (2ξ0 − Y (nt)0 )p0γ0
+2
∞∑
k=2
ξkpkγk
= Q(t) − δ0Q(nt)0 − δ1Q(nt)1 + 2
∞∑
k=0
ξkpkγk.
(20)
We thus obtain a minimum value of Q
(nt)
1 as a function
of Q
(nt)
0 :
Q
(nt)
1 >
δ2Q
(nt)−Q(t)−(δ2−δ0)Q(nt)0 −2
∞∑
k=0
ξkpkγk
δ2−δ1 .
(21)
Let ppe be the probability of choosing a pulse from the
SPDC process as the sample bits used for parameter es-
timation. Then, if we assume ǫpe = ǫ0 = ǫ1 = ǫ2 = · · ·
and note that k1 = Nppepkγk and k2 = Nppepk(1 − γk)
in ξk = ξ(ǫk, k1, k2), the above bound can be further rep-
resented by
Q
(nt)
1
Q(nt)
> [(δ2−δ)−(δ2−δ0)x−χ]δ2−δ1 , ζ(x), (22)
where N denotes the number of total pulses emit-
ted from the SPDC process, x =
Q
(nt)
0
Q(nt)
and χ =
1
Q(nt)
√
ln (1/ǫpe)
2Nppe
∞∑
k=0
√
δkpk. From Eq.(15), one can also
find that Y
(t)
1 > Y
(nt)
1 − 2ξ1. Therefore, we can also ob-
tain a lower bound for Q
(t)
1 :
Q
(t)
1 > δ1Q
(nt)
1 − χ1 > δ1Q(nt)ζ(x) − χ1, (23)
where χ1 =
√
δ1p1 ln (1/ǫpe)
2Nppe
.
C. single-photon error rate
The overall quantum bit error rate for the triggered
events and nontriggered events can be represented, re-
spectively, by
Q(t)E(t) =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(t)
n e
(t)
n =
∞∑
n=0
Y
(t)
n e
(t)
n pnγn, (24)
Q(nt)E(nt) =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(nt)
n e
(nt)
n =
∞∑
n=0
Y
(nt)
n e
(nt)
n pn(1− γn).
(25)
From Eqs.(15), (23) and (24) with e
(t)
0 =
1
2 , an upper
bound on e
(t)
1 is given by
e
(t)
1 6
Q(t)E(t)−Q(t)0 e(t)0
Q
(t)
1
6
2Q(t)E(t)−Q(t)0
2(δ1Q
(nt)
1 −χ1)
6
2Q(t)E(t)−δ0Q(nt)0 +χ0
2[δ1Q(nt)ζ(x)−χ1]
6 2δE
(t)−δ0x+χ0/Q(nt)
2δ1ζ(x)−2χ1/Q(nt) ,Wt(x),
(26)
where χ0 =
√
δ0p0 ln (1/ǫpe)
2Nppe
.
Similarly, from Eqs.(15), (22) and (25) with e
(nt)
0 =
1
2 ,
one can have an upper bound on e
(nt)
1 , which is shown
by
e
(nt)
1 6
Q(nt)E(nt)−Q(nt)0 e(nt)0
Q
(nt)
1
6 2E
(nt)−x
2ζ(x) , Wnt(x) (27)
D. Secret key length
If we consider the secret key only from the triggered
events and apply Lemma 2, a εsec-secret key of length ℓ
can be given by
⌊Hνmin(X(t)A |E′)− 2 log2 12ν ⌋, (28)
where X
(t)
A is the raw key extracted from the triggered
events, ν + ν ≤ εsec with ν and ν chosen to be propor-
tional to εsecppass .
Then, applying the results of Ref. [37], the length of
secret key from the triggered events can be represented
by
⌊n(t)0 + n(t)1 (1− h(e(t)p ))− λ(t)EC − 6 log2 10εsec − log2 2εcor ⌋,
(29)
where h(x) := −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy function, n
(t)
0 > NQ
(nt)(δ0x − χ0Q(nt) ) with χ0 =√
δ0p0 ln (1/ǫpe)
2N , n
(t)
1 > NQ
(nt)[δ1ζ(x)− χ1Q(nt) ], e
(t)
p denotes
the phase error rate which is calculated by Lemma 3,
λ
(t)
EC = NQ
(t)fECh(E
(t)). It should be noted that εsec =
9ε+ ǫpe where ǫpe is the failure probability of estimating
the single-photon yield and error rate mentioned in the
previous subsection. Let ǫpe = ε, then εsec = 10ε, which
is different from Ref. [37]. εcor is the security parameter
of the error-verification step. Hence, the length of the
secret key from the triggered events can be shown as
ℓT = min
x
{N(1− ppe)Q(nt)[δ0x− χ0Q(nt)
+(δ1ζ(x) − χ1Q(nt) )(1 − h(e
(t)
p ))]}
−N(1− ppe)Q(t)fECh(E(t))
−6 log2 10εsec − log2 2εcor ,
(30)
where χi =
√
δipi ln (1/ǫpe)
2Nppe
with i = 0 or i = 1, ppe is the
probability of choosing a pulse from the SPDC process
as the sample events used for parameter estimation and
e
(t)
p = g(Wt(x)). The minimum is numerically taken over
the range 0 6 x 6 min{2E(t)δ/δ0, 2E(nt)}.
However, if we also take the secret key from the non-
triggered events into account when the error reconcilia-
tion is separately applied to the triggered events and to
the nontriggered events, but the privacy amplification is
applied together, Eq.(28) no longer holds true and we
shall recalculate the length of the secret key by
⌊Hνmin(X(t)A X(nt)A |E(t)
′
E(nt)
′
)− 2 log2 12ν ⌋, (31)
6where X
(t)
A and X
(nt)
A are the raw key extracted from the
triggered and nontriggered events respectively, E(t)
′
and
E(nt)
′
are the information that Eve gathers on X
(t)
A and
X
(nt)
A , respectively, up to the error verification step. In
the following, we will show how to estimate a lower bound
of the left term in Eq.(31).
By Lemma 1, we have that
Hνmin(X
(t)
A X
(nt)
A |E(t)
′
E(nt)
′
)
> Hν2min(X
(t)
A |X(nt)A E(t)
′
E(nt)
′
)
+Hν3min(X
(nt)
A |E(t)
′
E(nt)
′
)− f(ν1)
= Hν2min(X
(t)
A |E(t)
′
) +Hν3min(X
(nt)
A |E(nt)
′
)− f(ν1),
(32)
where
f(ν1) = log2(2/ν
2
1),
ν = ν1 + 2ν2 + ν3,
Hν2min(X
(t)
A |E(t)
′
) > Hν2min(X
(t)
A |E(t))− λ(t)EC − log2(2/εcor),
Hν3min(X
(nt)
A |E(nt)
′
)
> Hν3min(X
(nt)
A |E(nt))− λ(nt)EC − log2(2/εcor).
(33)
In the above equations, E(t) and E(nt) denote the remain-
ing quantum information that Eve has on X
(t)
A andX
(nt)
A ,
respectively, after the error correction and error verifica-
tion steps. According to the analysis of Ref. [37], the
terms Hν2min(X
(t)
A |E(t)) and Hν3min(X(nt)A |E(nt)) in Eq.(33)
can be lower bounded by the generalized chain-rule result
(Lemma 1 [41]) and the uncertainty relation for smooth
entropies [35]. Precisely, they are given by
Hν2min(X
(t)
A |E(t))
> n
(t)
0 + n
(t)
1 (1− h(e(t)p ))− log2 2(α2α3)2 ,
Hν3min(X
(nt)
A |E(nt))
> n
(nt)
0 + n
(nt)
1 (1− h(e(nt)p ))− log2 2(α5α6)2 ,
(34)
where ν2 = 2α1 + α2 + α3 and ν3 = 2α4 + α5 + α6.
Combing Eqs.(31-34), the final secret key from both
the triggered and nontriggered events is said to be εsec-
secret if its length ℓB is chosen by
ℓB > n
(t)
0 + n
(nt)
0 + n
(t)
1 (1− h(e(t)p )) + n(nt)1 (1− h(e(nt)p ))
−λ(t)EC − λ(nt)EC − log2 2ν21 − log2
4
α2p
,
(35)
with
εsec = ν + ν + ǫpe
= ν1 + 2(2α1 + α2 + α3) + 2α4 + α5 + α6 + ν + ǫpe,
αp = α2α3α5α6εcorν,
(36)
where ǫpe is the failure probability of estimating the
single-photon yield and error rate.
For evaluation, we set each error term in Eq.(38) to a
common value ε and let ǫpe = ε. Therefore, the secrecy
for the key obtained from both the triggered events and
nontriggered events is εsec = 15ε. Then, considering the
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters for simulations: α
is the loss coefficient of the fiber, fEC is the error-correction
efficiency, ηB is the detection efficiency of Bob’s detectors, ed
is the error rate due to optical errors, which is the probability
that a photon sent from Alice hits the erroneous detector, pd
is the background dark-count rate of Bob’s detectors, ηA and
dA are the detection efficiency and dark count rate of Alice’s
detector, respectively.
α(dB/km) fEC ηB ed pd dA ηA
0.20 1.16 0.1 0.005 6× 10(−7) 10−6 0.5
bounds of single-photon yield and error rate given in the
previous subsections, ℓB can be obtained as the following
ℓB = min
x
{N(1− ppe)Q(nt)[(δ0x+ x− χ0Q(nt) )
+(δ1ζ(x) − χ1Q(nt) )(1 − h(e
(t)
p )) + ζ(x)(1 − h(e(nt)p ))]}
−N(1− ppe)Q(t)fECh(E(t))
−N(1− ppe)Q(nt)fECh(E(nt))
−2 log2 15εsec − 1− 10 log2 15εsec − log2 4εcor ,
(37)
where
χi =
√
δipi ln (15/εsec)
2Nppe
with i = 0 or 1,
e
(t)
p = g(Wt(x)),
e
(nt)
p = g(Wnt(x)).
(38)
In Eqs.(37) and (38), the minimum is numerically
taken over the range 0 6 x 6 min{2E(t)δ/δ0, 2E(nt)}
[48].
To conclude, the length of the final secret key can be
given as ℓ = max{ℓT , ℓB}.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, by assuming a fiber-based channel
model, we numerically show the performance of our pro-
tocol with finite-length key. Let ηc = 10
−αL/10 being the
fiber transmission with α = 0.2 dB/km the attenuation
coefficient, ηB the quantum efficiency of Bob’s detectors
and η ≡ ηcηB. For better comparison, we borrow exper-
imental parameters from Ref. [37], which assumes that
Bob uses an active measurement setup with two single-
photon detectors with total detection efficiency ηB = 0.1
and dark-count probability pd = 6 × 10−7. On the
sender’s side, we assume Alice uses a SPDCS and a typ-
ical silicon avalanche photodiode as threshold detector
with dA = 10
−6 and ηA = 0.5. The numerical parame-
ters used are listed in Table I.
For the average overall gain Q(t) and Q(nt), also the
average quantum bit error rate (QBER) E(t) and E(nt),
they can be directly measured in the experiment. In this
paper, for simulation purpose, we neglect the finite size
effect in the calculation of the average overall gain and
QBER. Then, according to the channel model, it is given
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Secret key rate vs transmission dis-
tance. The secret key rates from left to right are numerically
optimized for fixed number of total pulses from the SPDC
process N = 10j with j = 9, 10, . . . , 15. The dashed curve
denotes to the asymptotic secret key rate calculated from
Eqs.(9)-(14) in Ref. [48], i.e., the key rate of the AYKI proto-
col with keys of infinite length; The intensity µ of the SPDCS
and the probability ppe of sample events in the total pulses
are numerically chosen to be optimal for different transmis-
sion distances.
that
Q(t) =
∞∑
n=0
pnγn[1− (1− η)n(1− pd)2],
Q(nt) =
∞∑
n=0
pn(1− γn)[1− (1− η)n(1− pd)2],
E(t) = 1
2Q(t)
∞∑
n=0
pnγn{1− (1− η)n(1− pd)2
−(1− pd)[(1 − ηed)n − (1− η + ηed)n]},
E(nt) = 1
2Q(nt)
∞∑
n=0
pn(1− γn){1− (1− η)n(1− pd)2
−(1− pd)[(1 − ηed)n − (1− η + ηed)n]},
(39)
with pn =
µn
(1+µ)n+1 and γn = 1 − (1 − dA)(1 − ηA)n.
The summations in Eq.(39) can be solved mathemati-
cally. However, for simplicity, we do not give their ex-
pressions here.
In our simulations, the key’s secrecy εsec and correct-
ness εcor are set to be 10
−10 and 10−12, respectively.
For the estimation of the phase error rate, we assume
n = l > 125. Note that the analysis in Ref. [33] is based
on the QKD protocol with an ideal single-photon source.
However, in our paper, a practical SPDCS is used in our
protocol, which is within reach of current technology.
Hence, the sifted key bits n should be replaced by the
fraction bits of the single-photon contribution, that is,
n = N(1−ppe)Q1. Here, Q1 represents the gain from the
single-photon detections. Then, for the estimate of phase
error rate in Eqs.(30) and (37), i.e., e
(t)
p and e
(nt)
p , we
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Secret key rate vs transmission dis-
tance. N is fixed to be 1013. For different ppe = 0.01, 0.1, 0.9,
the solid lines (from left to right) are still plotted with inten-
sity µ chosen optimally for different transmission distances.
The dash-dotted curve denotes to the secret key rate when
ppe = 0.96 and the dashed curve still corresponds to the
asymptotic secret key rate.
shall set their n be N(1− ppe)Q(t)1 and N(1− ppe)Q(nt)1 ,
respectively. Likewise, the number of sample bits used
for parameter estimation, i.e., l(t) and l(nt) , are set to
be NppeQ
(t)
1 and NppeQ
(nt)
1 , respectively. Under these
conditions, we apply an optimization about the secret
key rate R = ℓ/(2N) over {x, µ, ppe} given that the set
{εsec, εcor, ed, ηB, pd, dA, ηA, fEC, Q(t), Q(nt), E(t), E(nt)}
is fixed.
In Fig.1, the numerically optimized secret key rates
from left to right are obtained by Eqs. (37) and (38)
for a fixed number of total pulses N = 10j with j =
9, 10, . . . , 15, respectively. It should be noted that, so as
to reach the distance of 100 km, N should be at least 109.
When we consider the postprocessing block size nX men-
tioned in Ref. [37], the least requirement corresponds to
nX > N(1−ppe)R > 106, larger than the one with aWCS
by Lim et al. [37]. But within the distance of 50 km for
N = 109, the secret key rate calculated by our method
can be higher than 5.397 × 10−4, which is better than
the one using a WCS (lower than 10−4 by Fig.1 of [37]).
And when one fixes N to 1013 corresponding to a post-
processing block size of 109, the maximal transmission
distance can reach to 167 km, which is getting close to
180 km with the WCS under the same conditions. Most
importantly, from Fig.1, one can find that the maximal
transmission distance of our method for N = 1013, 1014
and 1015 can be longer than 182 km, which performs bet-
ter than the case using WCS for a postprocessing block
size of 109.
In Fig.2, we also simulate the secret key rates for differ-
ent probabilities of ppe. Without loss of generality, when
8we fix N to be 1013, one can see that the the smaller value
of ppe results a lower secret key generation rate. When
ppe is larger than 0.9 (e.g. ppe = 0.96 ), the maximal
transmission distance is almost unchanged, representing
the optimality of ppe at 0.9. And our simulation is likely
to help experimentalists to improve the performance of
their QKD experiments using SPDCS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we put forward a passive decoy-state
protocol in the finite-size effect. For ε−secure secret keys
with finite length, the bound for estimating the single-
photon contributions, single-photon errors and the length
of final keys are presented. From numerical simulations,
we remark that the QKD using a SPDCS performs as
well as that using WCS. Furthermore, we conclude that
our passive decoy-state protocol with a finite-length key
can reach a higher secret transmission distance than that
using WCS. And our protocol can certainly be considered
as a choice for the practical experiment of QKD using
SPDCS.
We notice that a recent study by Krapick et al. [59]
proposed a kind of SPDCS with bright intensity, which
can be applied in our passive decoy-state protocol. It will
be attractive and interesting to analyze the performance
of QKD using this source. We shall concentrate on this
issue in future works.
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